

(This is the 4th video in the series, starting with Video 2)

In my previous video, I considered a revision to *this* pro-life argument (Video 2) that restricts the outcomes only to those not due to external malevolent agents. While it avoided my original counterexamples, it was subject to counterexamples of its own.

But they still involved external agents—though not malevolent ones—so what if we restrict it to only those outcomes not due to any external agents whatsoever, whether malevolent or not?

So here's the revised argument:

(P1***) Pregnancy is a foreseeable outcome of sex that's not due to any external agent.

(P2***) Consent to X is consent to any foreseeable outcome of X that's not due to any external agent.

(C) So, consent to sex is consent to pregnancy.

Now I have the same two problems with Premise 2 that I had before. First, it seems arbitrary or ad hoc. See my previous video for more explanation.

And second, it still seems open to counterexamples. And here I must, once again, appeal to the Queen herself, Judith Jarvis Thomson—in particular, her people-seeds scenario.

Suppose people-seeds float about in the air like pollen, and if you open your windows for fresh air, they can become implanted in your rugs or furniture. Once implanted, they develop into person-plants and grow into fully developed persons after nine months. Also, suppose all of this is common knowledge.

So, having a person-plant take root in your house is a foreseeable outcome of opening your window, one that's not due to an external agent. And yet, opening a window is *still* not consent to let a person-plant grow in your house.

So, premise 2 is false, and the argument remains unsound.

References

Judith Jarvis Thomson – “A Defense of Abortion”