

(This is the 2nd video in the series that begins with Video 2)

Some people offered suggestions on how to revise this Pro-Life argument (Video 2) to get around my counterexamples. So, I'm going to consider them.

Some people said it's not just *any* foreseeable risks, but *likely* or *common* foreseeable risks. So let's make that revision. Obviously, we have to add the word "likely" to both premises to make the argument valid.

(P1*) Pregnancy is a *likely* foreseeable outcome of sex.

(P2*) Consent to X is consent to any *likely* foreseeable outcome of X.

(C) So, consent to sex is consent to pregnancy.

(You'll notice that changed the word "risk" to "outcome", because I think "risk" was causing unnecessary confusion.)

Now, we probably need to ask roughly what is meant by "likely"—in other words, roughly how likely does it need to be?

But let's suppose we get an answer that makes premise P1* true.

The problem is, I think premise P2* is just as easy to counterexample as before.

If you live in a place where getting your car stolen is likely, consent to buying a car is *still* not consent to getting it stolen.

If you live in a place where burglars are common, consent to opening a window is *still* not consent to a burglar entering.

If you live somewhere where getting assaulted on a date is likely, again, consent to a date is still not consent to getting assaulted.

So, in my opinion, this revision doesn't work. P2* is false, and the argument's still unsound.