

(This video references Video 25.)

In this video (Video 25), I gave what I take to be a counterexample to this principle:

(D) It's always wrong to deprive an individual of a FLO.

Some people objected that my case did *not* involve depriving an individual of a FLO, since the alleged individual in question wasn't conceived yet and so didn't exist at the time.

I understand this objection, and I don't think it's completely unreasonable. However, let me explain why I don't think it's good objection.

There are at least two candidate individuals that we could reasonably say are being deprived of a FLO in my case, although they are different sorts of individuals than the already-conceived individual in cases of abortion.

First, there's the sperm-egg pair. Every possible combination of a sperm and an egg has at least the potential to result in a unique human life. And one such pair *will* have a FLO in my case, unless person A or B does something to stop it.

The other candidate is the future conceived human. It hasn't been conceived yet, but again it *will* be, unless A or B stop it.

You might complain that it's odd to talk about depriving a future individual of something, but this whole argument already relies on the idea of talking about future things, namely futures like ours. It seems completely arbitrary to me to be concerned about the future of the already-conceived individual but not the future of the soon-to-be-conceived one.