

Some people are responding to this video (Video 2) by calling my examples flawed and pointing out disanalogies between those cases and pregnancy. It's an understandable response, but it's based on a confusion.

Specifically, it's confusing two things: an argument by analogy and a counterexample to a principle.

Some people think I'm making an argument like this:

(A1) Consent to opening a window is not consent to a burglar entering.

(A2) If consent to opening a window is not consent to a burglar entering, then consent to sex is not consent to pregnancy.

(A3) So, consent to sex is not consent to pregnancy.

Notice here, this is an argument by analogy. It's comparing two cases and saying, "Since consent doesn't transfer in the first case, consent doesn't transfer in the second case."

If this were the argument I were making, then yes, pointing out relevant disanalogies between the cases would undermine the argument.

However, this is not the argument I made. All I argued is that premise P2 in the original argument has counterexamples, so it's false.

A counterexample is just a case that contradicts a general principle. For instance, a counterexample to "All Fs are G" would be an F that's not G.

In this case, the principle, P2, is "Consent to X is consent to any foreseeable risk of X".

So a counterexample to this principle would be a case in which you DO consent to an X but you DON'T consent to a foreseeable risk of X.

And the three cases I mentioned—the car, the window, the date—are all cases like this.